

“It’s like Hawai’i”: Making a tourist utopia in Jeju Island, 1963-1985

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Abstract: This paper examines the trajectory, ambitions, and practices involved in the official national and provincial planning for Jeju Island from 1963 to 1985 as it became reimagined as the so-called ‘Hawai’i of East Asia’. Jeju Island has been constantly built, left unfinished, demolished, and rebuilt at each wave and ebb in regional tourism trends. Jeju has thus become a complicated geography of heavy contradictions as South Korea’s prime tourism experiment. Before the 2002 ‘Free International City’ project, the larger region of Jeju Island was identified as a ‘specified region’ from 1963 for experimentation in tourism. By virtue of its historic marginality, Jeju has been portrayed as a pristine internal frontier ripe for tourism and utopian transformation ‘like Hawai’i’. Surprisingly, however, ‘Hawai’i’ does not actually appear in official planning documentation, even while it is a frequent talking point in public discourse. In this paper, I discuss the specter of ‘Hawai’i’ in Jeju tourism development and address the discrepancy between official development planning strategies and colloquial references to Hawai’i, observing that reference to ‘Hawai’i’ was not from initial design but followed the late 1950s to 1960s zeitgeist in which tourism itself became a mark of distinction for modernity.

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In Sinjeju, there usually are new phone shops coming up, especially in Jewon. Here’s the funny thing that happened. I went into a cosmetics shop in Jewon [...] and I asked a lady if I could find like whatever kind of lipsticks and she didn’t understand me [...] It made me feel like, OK, I’m speaking Jeju in Jeju and no one understands me! And I got out of the place and looked around Jewon and it made me feel so sad, like some shops, their signs are all written in Chinese and it’s not for me but for them. You know what I mean? [...] I feel that we’re losing what we have. I feel sad that they buy buildings in Jeju and that they employ Jeju people. It’s like Hawai’i [...] This island is becoming more international, but! It’s losing itself. And I’m not in favor of it.

– YK, Jeju City, March 23, 2015

Introduction

The ‘Hawai’i of Korea’ or ‘Hawai’i of East Asia’ monikers are derided as much as they are taken seriously among self-identified Jeju Islanders. Jeju, an island region a little less than 100 km (approx. 60 miles) from the southernmost tip of mainland South Korea, has garnered a domestic reputation as the country’s prime tourism retreat since the 1960s. On both sides of the Pacific, the term ‘Hawai’i’ evokes isolation, exoticism, and tourism, as well as femininity and hospitality (Goss, 1993). One can find similar traits showcased in Jeju photographic portrayals where natural or tourist sites “are ‘groomed’ and appear especially pristine and unspoiled” (Hunter, 2010, p. 689) as well as in manifold references to the island’s *Samda* (Three Abundances) of rocks, wind, and women. Such select representations are ubiquitous to the point that they may be more real to their respective mainlander audiences than the physical island spaces. One may note a discrepancy, however, between official plans and the public and colloquial references to Hawai’i. In this article, I observe that Jeju being something ‘like Hawai’i’ was not necessarily from initial design, but rather emerged in the late 1950s to 1960s zeitgeist in the US-aligned bloc in which leisure and tourism came to be markers of advanced capitalist nation status. Aspirations to be ‘like’ have been instrumental in driving perpetual tourism development.

The interviewee YK in the quote above was, at the time of the 2015 interview, a young woman who was just finishing her high school education; a rare local in an international school located in Jeju’s Global Education City located in Daejeong-eup, a rural region to the southwest. The Global Education City’s construction itself, YK had indicated in the interview, was a violent intrusion on Jeju’s ever-shrinking *gotjawal* forests — but one example of the many. YK frequently remarked on Jeju’s long experience with violent intrusions on the island, whether it was the disruptive over-tourism of the 2010s or the South Korean state’s brutal counter-insurgency operations in the 1947–1954 Jeju Massacre or ‘April Third Incident’ (Kim, 2014), which also affected both sides of YK’s family. Going as far as to distinguish her own speech as Jeju speech in contrast to Seoul-based standard Korean, her mention of being like ‘Hawai’i’ comes with strong reservations. YK, who was fully conversant in English, was aware of Jeju’s strides as a cosmopolitan and urbanizing tourist destination. Her remarks further demonstrated a keen awareness about the implications of being like ‘Hawai’i’ — to be desired and marginalized at the same time.

When did Jeju become ‘like Hawai’i’? What may come as a surprise is that ‘Hawai’i’ does not appear in state-sponsored planning documents. Even before the Free International City (sometimes colloquially called the Hongapore project) in 2002, official designs for Jeju development identified Hong Kong and Singapore, not Hawai’i, as potential models. On the other hand, ‘Hawai’i’ has long circulated in common parlance. Early Jeju tourism boosters, notably the Seoul-appointed Governors Gim Yeonggwon (1962) and Jeong Usik (1967; Halla Ilbo, 2004), marketed Jeju as South Korea’s response to Hawai’i or the ‘Hawai’i of East Asia’ in public statements. Amidst the uncertainty of the 1960s, state authorities and planners increasingly looked to tourism. Tourism had a dual role as both a stimulus to resource-poor local economies and a means to inspire national self-confidence. As United States policymakers utilized tourism in Hawai’i to domesticate its island frontier and formally integrate its newest state into a showpiece for national strategy, the South Korean state and business interests sought to do likewise for their internal colony of Jeju. Given that the

meaning of ‘Hawai’i’ is context dependent, throughout this text I note it in quotation marks when it refers not specifically to the actual region of Hawai’i but ‘Hawai’i’ as an idea.

The scope of this article mainly focuses on the period starting in the year 1963, when Jeju was designated first designated a *jayuhang* (free harbor) and *teukjeong jiyek* (specified region), to 1985 when state-sponsored development plans featured expansive *gukje sujun* (world-class) tourism projects in anticipation of a 1988 Seoul Olympics tourism boom. Though the *Tourism Business Promotion Act* and Korea Tourism Organization were established between 1961-1962 (Hong, 2013, p. 116), not long after Park Chung Hee’s (Bak Jeonghui; r. 1961-1979) May 19 coup, it was in 1963 that preparations for establishing the Jeju Autonomous Region as a *jayuhang* (free trade port) was set as a development goal (Jeju Province, 2003, p. 15) and ideas about tourism began to come into fruition. Concrete tourism-related proposals appeared in 1964 and became increasingly ambitious by 1985, when the tourism sector began to surpass the island’s traditional fishing and agriculture industries.

This article is divided into five sections. In this introduction, I discuss the paradoxes of tourism and Jeju’s complex history with mainland South Korea. The second section is a glimpse at the pre-history of the ‘Hawai’i of East Asia’ moniker in the presidency of Syngman Rhee — who had lived in Hawai’i prior to Korea’s 1945 liberation and had a controversial relationship with Jeju post-1945 — and the 1960-1961 transitional regime of Prime Minister Chang Myon (Jang Myeon). The third section examines provincial- and national-level planning policy and projections for Jeju from 1963 to 1971 when the South Korean state began to afford more systematic consideration to Jeju’s tourism potential. References to ‘Hawai’i’ in terms of tourism and marketing the exotic increasingly appear in discourse during this period. The fourth section considers national and provincial development plans in 1982 and 1985 when planners were more confident in international success in the wake of the Japanese tourism wave and euphoria over preparations for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. In the concluding section, I consider the continuities between the ‘Hawai’i of East Asia’ and the 2002 Free International City project.

In exploring the official designs on Jeju and teasing out the specter of ‘Hawai’i’, I utilize original planning documents and data produced by the national and provincial governments and the state-sponsored National Development Institute and Jeju Research Institute (formerly Jeju Development Institute), as well as official aerial photographs from 1967 (the oldest available aerial photographs provided by the Jeju provincial government) and 1985. This discussion draws mostly upon two major Jeju-specific development plans: 1) the 1964 *Conceptualization for the Jeju Province Comprehensive Construction Plan and Examination of Immediate Necessary Policy Measures* (hereafter *Construction Plan*; Ministry of Construction, 1964a), and 2) the 1985 *Comprehensive Development Plan for the Jeju Province Specified Region* (hereafter *Comprehensive Development Plan*; Jeju Province, 1985). Neither refer to ‘Hawai’i’, but they do provide the general plan for Jeju’s tourism transformation.

As ‘Hawai’i’ comparisons appear in public discourse rather than planning documents, I refer to media columns in national newspapers; the sparse transcribed speeches and essays of the 1966-1968 Jeju governor Jeong Usik in the provincial government periodical *Jejudo* (e.g., Jeong, 1967); newspaper editorial commentaries from the *Jeju Sinmun* newspaper from 1971 to 1989; and personal reflections from Jeju Islanders Jung Sinji (Jeong Sinji) and YK. Jung Sinji and YK both came of age after this article’s focus period of 1963 to 1985, but their personal experiences in the post-developmental years and the onset of the 2002 Free

International City elucidate much on the mixed legacies of the earlier tourism projects and portents for where Jeju is headed amidst a massive resurgence in domestic novelty tourism.

What makes Jeju of such interest for both the South Korean state and mainland South Korean tourists? Jeju's tourist allure has always been the island region's volcanic landscape and 'Otherness'. If there is any rupture between pre-twentieth- and twentieth-century perceptions of Jeju, it is the change in well-to-do mainland Koreans' attitudes toward the island. Parallel to Hawai'i's historical experience, Jeju was once a distinct kingdom called Tamna, which was gradually annexed from 1105 to serve the geopolitical interests of an expanding state based on the continental mainland. Like its counterpart on the other side of the Pacific (Goss, 1993, p. 675), twentieth-century tourism promoters were convinced that the principal appeal for Jeju were its paradoxical closeness and difference. Jeju is at once undeniably a part of South Korea at not too far a remove, yet exotic enough to seem almost foreign.

The key difference between Hawai'i and Jeju, aside from their different climates and cultural contexts, however, is that whereas the former enticed mainland settler colonialist desires since the nineteenth century (Skwiot, 2010), the latter had been denigrated among mainland Korean literati. Before the twentieth century, one rarely went to Jeju willingly. The very features that have since the 1960s drawn curious tourists were regarded as proof of the island's barbarity: fierce winds and fickle weather, rocky terrain unsuited for large-scale rice farming, and a higher female population due to high male mortality rates. Aside from oppressive tribute demands on an impoverished region, Jeju suffered periodic violent incursions, insurgencies, and counter-insurgencies. Perception that Jeju was a land of potential opportunity began to take shape only in the second half of the twentieth century. Whereas mainlander elites once described Jeju as an uncivilized barren geography of exile (Yun, 2015, p. 42) in the Goryeo (918-1392) and Joseon (1392-1910) eras, this perceived absence of civilization increasingly became recast as an asset by 1985. The Korean-yet-not-Korean ambivalence that YK expressed above is pervasive among self-identified islanders and forms the basis for Jeju being 'like Hawai'i'.

Before 'Dongyang-ui Hawai' (Hawai'i of East Asia), 1957-1961

If we are to cultivate this region like 'Hawai'i,' the imbalanced and low living standards of this region's people are to be increased and if this is accomplished together also with 'maritime development,' it will also naturally settle the problem of the Peace Line that gives our country headaches.

– *Donga Ilbo* Special Correspondent Yi Ganghyeon, January 1, 1961

Before 'Hawai'i'

Before going into the details of the significance of 1963 and the two planning documents for 1964 and 1985, a prehistory of the 'Hawai'i' association is worth exploring. While access to documentation has proven challenging in 2020-2021, owing to obstacles posed by COVID-19 and limitations as a non-citizen of South Korea, key documents reviewed here have proven instructive. As tourism scholar Min Seongmin (2010) notes, the precise origins of 'Hawai'i of Korea' or 'Hawai'i of East Asia' monikers are ambiguous. The phrase predates the major tourism projects of the mid-1960s, but it was after 1966 that the 'Hawai'i' association overtly and almost exclusively referred to tourism aspirations. In the following, I refer to articles in

the national newspapers *Donga Ilbo* and *Kyunghyang* (*Gyeonghyang*) *Sinmun*, which have what may be the earliest commentaries that link Jeju, ‘Hawai’i’, and tourism. The works of architectural historian Gim Tae’il (2007, Gim T. et al., 2012) and anthropologist Yi Gi’uk (2003) provide some additional hints for where to start in locating when ‘Hawai’i’ as a concept figures into Jeju imagined space. Both Gim Tae’il and Yi Gi’uk note that explicit reference to ‘Hawai’i’ and the actual region of Hawai’i emerges in the late 1950s, though exoticizing Jeju was hardly a new practice. Western visitors described the island as an idyllic pastoral or even a place ‘steeped with mystery’ (Yi Gi’uk, 2003, p. 192) as early as 1946. The adjective *sinbihan*, or ‘mysterious’, appeared again in 1962 in the words of then-governor of Jeju Gim Yeonggwon, but comparisons to ‘Hawai’i’ seemed to have different connotations before the mid-1960s.

Putting forth Hawai’i as a potential vision may have begun with Syngman Rhee (Yi Seungman; r. 1948–1960) as Gim Tae’il (2007) suggests in his account of Songdang Ranch. During the late 1950s, President Syngman Rhee increasingly viewed Jeju Island as a tranquil getaway and his potential vacation home. Rhee thus commissioned American advisers to search for the perfect ranch site in the interior upland regions. The candidate sites were Seogwang in the southwest, Geumak in the west, and Songdang in the east. What all three geographies had in common was that they were far removed from any population centers and surrounded by open grasslands and rolling hills. Jeju’s broader portrayal as a tranquil escape coincided with the fallout and aftermath of the Korean War on the peninsula, as the island became the temporary home to a large war refugee presence. Syngman Rhee personally selected Songdang as his vacation home during his May 23, 1957 visit.

Rhee’s decision to establish a ranch on Jeju was likely motivated by his own earlier experiences in Hawai’i prior to Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. Rhee personally oversaw the Songdang Ranch’s redesignation as the Jeju National Ranch with the assistance of James Alward Van Fleet, the then-chair of the Korea Society (Oh Y., 2018, pp. 179–182). He commissioned a special detached presidential retreat that comprised Jeju’s signature basalt and featured décor that gestured at traditional East Asian symbolism. The building was both modern by 1950s standards and yet also decorated with Korean motifs, which highlighted Rhee’s emphasis on ethnonationalism as the ideological basis for South Korea, and perhaps signals his aspirations for Jeju. Rhee is notorious for having ordered a systematic slaughter in the ‘April Third Incident’ of 1948 when some Jejuans openly rebelled against separate elections that formalized the Koreas’ division, but he had a special attachment to the National Ranch and perhaps harbored some longer-term plans for Jeju.

Tourism as an industry in post-Korean War South Korea was in its infancy. Starting in 1958, Korean National Airlines (now Korean Air) operated flight service to Jeju; the company expressed interest in investing in tourist facilities for Jeju around the same time (Halla Ilbo, 2004, pp. 171–172). A year later, on August 30, 1959, Jeju’s first 82-room ‘modern’ tourist hotel, the Seogwipo Tourist Hotel, was opened. Jeju was already known to Koreans as a destination for school trips in postwar years. The island’s geographical exoticness was increasingly billed as South Korea’s potential experiment, as tourism became popularized in the US-aligned bloc. It was in this context that connections between Jeju, ‘Hawai’i’, and tourism began to take shape. Rhee’s administration entertained the idea of some form of tourism for Jeju, but Rhee was overthrown in 1960 amidst the April 19 Revolution popular uprisings, and whatever plans he may have had were jettisoned.

The prospect for tourism did not at all disappear. Talk of tourism, even if still wishful thinking, carried into the transitional Chang Myon regime. ‘Hawai’i’, as in the preceding Rhee regime, seemed to refer to a remote rural getaway and did not necessarily refer to middle class leisure as it would come to in the late 1960s. A January 1st, 1961 article by special correspondent Yi Ganghyeon in *Donga Ilbo* titled ‘A Site for a New Life with Rising Hopes’ opens with the three subtexts “The fields of Jeju calls for settlers,” “If development shall come, some tens of thousands can live peacefully,” and “Extensive use for intensive farming and tourism sites.” The potential agricultural and tourism good life that Yi envisions is rather modest as proposals simply focus on immediate needs, particularly post-April Third Incident recovery. Comparison to ‘Hawai’i’ stops at similarities in terrain, including a stark lack of accessible fresh water typical of volcanic islands, and implies a ‘virgin landscape’ ripe with potential. ‘Hawai’i’ also indicates peace — or at least a geopolitical stability — as the actual Hawai’i does for the United States; the ‘Peace Line’ mentioned refers to the ‘Syngman Rhee Line’ maritime boundaries for South Korea, which was not recognized by the international community. Yi does not romanticize Jeju as an idyllic paradise, but he does indicate changing attitudes toward Jeju.

Envisioning paradise

Indeed, if we are to take this opportunity to be inclined to give a little more enthusiasm and money to this island, I don’t think there’s much reason Jeju would fall to Hawai’i in the Pacific or Bermuda in the Atlantic.

– Jeju Governor Gim Yeongwan, October 6, 1962

A year after military strongman Park Chung Hee’s May 16, 1961 coup, Gim Yeongwan, an admiral appointed as Jeju governor by Park in 1962, wrote a column entitled ‘I Propose Development for a Tourist Jeju’ for the *Kyunghyang* newspaper. He urged the South Korean state and populace to more enthusiastically invest in Jeju tourism facilities. Jeju, he reasoned, could become a “great tourism destination” that would propel South Korea to the world stage because its “graceful mountain and seas are even in mysterious legends” (Gim Y., 1962). In an echo of pre-twentieth-century literati descriptions, albeit spun positively, Gim (1962) noted that “Jeju is a foreign land to Korea” that seems to be “other” to the mainland and possesses “mysterious” customs and a natural beauty that rivalled Hawai’i and Bermuda. Jeju’s Three Abundances of rocks, wind, and women were becoming a selling point rather than an observation on Jeju’s extremes.

However well-intentioned, the columnist Yi’s (1961) and Governor Gim’s (1962) visions for Jeju’s interior as a land of opportunity and the pastoral good life mask the legacies of mainland Korean state abuse. Aside from general economic deprivation, Jeju had not recovered from April Third. The entire upland region was forcibly depopulated due to punitive counter-insurgency operations (Kim, 2014, pp. 34-35). It was only after September 21, 1954 that the South Korean state reopened the interior uplands (Kim, 2014, p. 36), which included the island’s iconic dormant shield volcano of Hallasan, for both resettlement and casual visitation. There were new possibilities with a fresh wilderness and Jeju’s fabled peak made available to the public again. Though agricultural colonization and fulfilling basic needs were still emphasized more than tourism as representing the good life for a mostly destitute

population, Jeju was being envisioned as a prime testing ground for experiments that could satisfy the nationalized obsession for modernization and global stature.

Interest in Jeju tourism paralleled developments across the Pacific. The Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA), a trans-Pacific tourism promotion organization first established in 1951, was first introduced to Jeju in 1961 and carried out an official visit in 1965. PATA concluded that the island region had potential to be a future tourism destination (Halla Ilbo, 2004, p. 174). Changes in attitudes toward Jeju coincided with increasingly comprehensive tourism developments in Hawai'i, which became a state of the United States of America in 1959. Hawai'i had been known as a tourism destination since its 1898 annexation, but it was its 1959 statehood, as well as changing socioeconomic and technological trends, that enabled middle class mass tourism to accelerate development — much to the consternation of many an indigenous Hawaiian (Mak, 2008, p. 47; Taum, 2010, p. 31).

How closely think tanks and officials in South Korea considered the Hawai'i model, however, is not clear, though Governor Gim Yeonggwon had mentioned it. South Korean leaders were likely aware of Hawai'i's rising success, given that 'Hawai'i' had been in the discourse for some time before actual developments began. The Park regime's lieutenants and Park himself may not have been the first to come up with the ideas of a tourist Jeju, but they happened to be in the right place at the right time to put them into action.

From free harbor to 'Hawai'i of East Asia,' 1963–1971

'Hawai'i of Korea,' 'Hong Kong of Korea'... As the dreams of Tamna expand to the fullest extent, in the home of the Three Abundances of women, wind, and stones, provincial residents are painting a bountiful future as a golden wave approaches.

– *Dong'a Ilbo* Special Correspondent Gim Won'gi, August 1, 1964

'Dreams of Tamna'

'Hawai'i of Korea' and 'Hawai'i of East Asia' appear as set phrases from 1964 to 1966, but the name 'Hawai'i' itself does not appear in official planning documents between 1964 and 1985. Whether 'Hawai'i' came as an afterthought or if it lingered in the back of planners' minds is ambiguous, though it clearly was a factor given its continued use in public discourse. On the contrary, what were directly named as potential development models were Hong Kong and Singapore, as if anticipating the 2002 Free International City project (see Jeju Free International Development Center, n.d.). In 1966 and 1967, Governor Jeong Usik curiously linked 'Hawai'i' to the state-sponsored five-year plans — even though it does not actually appear in them — in his speech 'A Year of Advancement'. The discrepancy between what was stated and what was written is a puzzling one, but one may infer hints of 'Hawai'i' behind the text and between the lines.

The *Halla Ilbo* (2004, p. 180) newspaper's history of Jeju tourism development from the postliberation period up to the early 2000s indicates the period from 1964 to Jeong Usik's 1966–1968 governorship as the age of the 'Hawai'i of East Asia'. I also take this position, though I note above that the 'Hawai'i' comparison was hardly new. Tourism proposals that were first tossed about in the Syngman Rhee and Chang Myon years came into being only from the mid-1960s onwards, and it is also from this time that references to 'Hawai'i' in terms of tourism within Jeju are more prominent. In the *Jeju Sinmun*, a major local paper,

commentators refer to Jeju as being like ‘Hawai’i’ or even surpassing the beauty of the actual Hawai’i in 1973 and in 1975. It therefore seems likely that even if the terms predated 1966 in mainland-based discourse, it was from Governor Jeong Usik’s time that the Hawai’i-tourism-Jeju link began to become locally prominent within Jeju.

The Park Chung Hee regime took power at an opportune time. State-sponsored export-led modernization programs were in vogue and Jeju’s unique geography lent itself well to Park’s ambitions for raising South Korea’s national stature. Only two years after his coup, his newly established regime designated Jeju as a *teukjeong jiyeok*, or specified region, in 1963. The designation appears to foreshadow the region’s 2006 conversion to a *teukbyeol jachido* (special self-governing province), though planning was top-down. The rationale was that “as an island region being far removed from the mainland [...] it is appropriate to see it as an isolated special region” (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 9). This was geographical common sense, but what was consequential was that technocrats felt that Jeju merited its own special attention and prioritized it with the other special development zones, including the Seoul Capital Area, by 1971. Given Jeju’s proximity to continental East Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Japan, the state entertained the idea of making Jeju a *jayuhang* (free harbor), or South Korea’s response to the then-emerging entrepot of Hong Kong, in which it could serve as an export processing zone or at least an intermediary for the shipment of goods (Ministry of Construction, 1964b, p. 49). Though the idea was nixed due to its impracticality, as Jeju City Harbor was not near any major oceanic trade routes and the island region in general had no natural harbor and natural resources for industrial development, planners remained convinced that Jeju’s unique geographical position could amount to something eventually. If not South Korea’s Hong Kong, Jeju still could be an export processing zone of modest scale, a key producer of local specialty agricultural products, seafood resources, and a tourist resort (Ministry of Construction, 1964b, p. 7). In official plans, Jeju remained a *teukjeong jiyeok* for the subsequent decades.

In 1964, state planners under the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (now the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport) compiled a handwritten *Construction Plan* in preparation for a broad program with comprehensive policy recommendations. Governor Gim Yeonggwon may have painted a rosy picture for Jeju’s ‘Hawai’i’ future in 1962, but the region was still in glaring poverty and demanded far more than just enthusiasm. The *Construction Plan* describes much of Jeju’s land as idled and in need for a concerted development effort. A terse line on a budget item proposes a sum of KRW 93,661,600 to reconstruct 2,209 homes destroyed in the ‘April Third Incident’ (Ministry of Construction 1964a, p. 213). As was the case in Yi Ganghyeon’s article three years earlier, Jeju had still not yet recovered by the time the state began to take more concrete action. The ‘Hawai’i’ correctives mentioned in 1961 and 1962 are not discussed in the 1964 *Construction Plan*, but the program was still the same: an overall strategy that combined land reclamation for new agricultural, ranching, and tourism projects making use of the as-yet idled land around Hallasan and the interior upland.

Jeju was, for all intents and purposes, a tabula rasa waiting to be reinscribed. In the same space where the *Construction Plan*’s authors emphasize a severe lack in mineral and water resources necessary for any major industry (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 9), the island is described as having “remarkable room for development in agriculture, husbandry, fishery, and tourism resources.” What Jeju had was space, especially the interior uplands that were still derelict

from the April Third fallout. It was not just any space, but an exotic space. The planning commission recognized that tourism to Jeju's untapped natural sites could uplift the local economy as well as foster local and national pride (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 112).

What needed to be resolved was to how to make Jeju accessible, first at least for the domestic population and then for a steadily growing number of foreign tourists. Jeju had far less than adequate infrastructure, even compared to the still-impooverished mainland. The eventual goal hinted on notes in the tourist site inventory was to connect recognized or potential tourist landmarks in the north-northeast part of the island from Gwandeok Pavilion in Jeju City to Ilchulbong (Sunrise Peak) in Seongsan on the island's easternmost point (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 144). Two tourist access roads were prioritized with specified funding targets: the Seogwipo-Daejeong road at KRW 57 million and the Jungmun-Yeongsil Trail road at KRW 4.5 million (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 212). The plan further recommended a KRW 2.7 million survey for a new city development for Seogwipo along with new tourist hotels in an estimated area of 40 square kilometers (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 213). To draw tourists and development toward the island's depopulated interior, the plan also suggested hotels and ski resorts at the base of Hallasan, and even a cable car (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 144). Other facilities proposed included the Racehorse Park and the folk village museum. The state planned for more upscale leisure activity and domestic cultural tourism alongside each other as economic modernization was intertwined with nation-state building.

The *Construction Plan* may not at all mention 'Hawai'i', and is rather modest in scope in contrast to the 'Hawai'i' rhetoric in public discourse, but, like Hawai'i, the initial focus for Jeju tourism seemed to be toward those "in search of a predictable vacation experience" (Goss, 1993, p. 665). Just as tourist advertising in Hawai'i by the 1970s tended to be directed toward potential domestic US American visitors already aware of the locale's offerings, reputation, and associated catchphrases, the 1964 plan suggests that Jeju tourism was also for a primarily domestic market. Jeju was, after all, a destination for *suhak yeonhaeng* (class trip) visitors, who comprised 11,361 of 50,019 registered annual visitors; only 1.66% of visitors were of foreign origin (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 151). Named potential tourist sites ranged from Samseonghyeol (a park featuring a shrine to Jeju Islanders' mythical ancestors) to prominent volcanic formations such as Sanbongsan peak by the island's southwest coast (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, pp. 144-146). Jeju's iconic central shield volcano Hallasan is not surprisingly at the top of the list and again highlighted in the 1971 *National Comprehensive Development Plan* (Ministry of Construction, 1971, p. 130); Hallasan, along with its immediate environs, was designated a national park in 1970. The *Construction Plan* further proposed the '*Yeongju sipgyeong*' (Ten Sights of Yeongju; Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 26), which referred to Jeju's mythical link to the fabled island of immortality and were identified by Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) mainland-appointed officials, as well as exiles, as tourism assets. In 1964 and even in the later 1971 national-level plans, the state did not yet consider tourism in broad international terms beyond those suggested in the public 'Hawai'i' pronouncements and occasional reference to alleged US Americans' praise (Sin, 1975/1996, p. 126).

What was proposed in 1964 did not immediately come into effect. International visitation seems to have been viewed as incidental, and international marketing tended to simply refer to Japan. Aside from supplementing the economy, even by 1971 tourism's purpose was more overtly nationalistic than international, and framed in terms of uplifting

national pride in South Korea's natural and cultural assets (Ministry of Construction, 1971, p. 109). In the earliest Park era aerial photographs of Jeju taken in 1967, three years after the *Construction Plan*, it appears that little had come about aside from infrastructural expansion. The tourist access roads prioritized in 1964 were still mostly unpaved. The only notable tourist hotels were the Jeju Tourist Hotel in Jeju City and the Paradise Hotel in Seogwipo, both sponsored by Zainichi (Korean immigrants in Japan), but even these were not fully completed until 1967. Yet, from 1964 to 1971, monetary and visitation figures were projected to rapidly grow over the following decade, with an estimated potential figure of KR₩ 481,724,000 by 1981. This was a modest figure, but a substantial one nonetheless considering that Jeju's total GDP was estimated at KR₩ 50.05 billion in 1964. The discrepancy between the plans' modest scope, not to mention the absence of any 'Hawai'i' mention, and Governors Gim Yeonggwon's and Jeong Usik's insistence on 'Hawai'i of Korea' or 'Hawai'i of East Asia' suggests that 'Hawai'i' was not so much a model but an example of what Jeju could be.

Three Abundances

Furthermore, in the span of the last year in this province, ahead of the development plan as a specified region, not only has there been active promotion for the various development plans that are in accord with the Second Five-Year Plan, from this now, owing to the condition that this region being blessed with natural resources, the basis for becoming a tourism destination like the 'Hawai'i of East Asia' and a pastureland like the 'Denmark of the Far East' has been firmly prepared.

– Jeju Governor Jeong Usik (1967, p. 31)

The late 1960s to early 1970s was a time ripe for the very tourism experimentation that former Governor Gim Yeonggwon had suggested in 1962. From the late 1950s, in the US-aligned bloc, the zeitgeist for mass tourism was one in which “modernization, collective security, and mass consumption converged in the promotion of U.S. overseas tourism” (Skwiot, 2010, p. 171). Free travel did not only exemplify the fruits of economic prowess for the capitalist- and US-aligned world, but also provided stimulus for partaking in the leisure activities that defined middle class lifestyles. Where South Korea differed from the United States, however, was that US American tourism promotion was intended to counter rival nationalisms and project US influence abroad, while South Korean tourism, ideally at least, had the dual function of nation-state building by way of inculcating national pride in the homeland and supplementing the long-term goal of economic self-sufficiency. Another consequential change was South Korea's diplomatic rapprochement with Japan and the 1965 normalization treaty that enabled easier movement between the two countries just as Japan's economy began to resurge. Amidst a growing trend for tourism, especially from Japan, Jeju happened to be abundant in exotic reputation, an impoverished population in need of job opportunities, and cheap land for tourism resort complexes.

That Japan figures already into the 1964 plans and again in subsequent plans into the end of the century is due to four crucial factors: 1) diplomatic rapprochement between South Korea and Japan; 2) a surge in Japanese overseas travel after the 1964 Tokyo Olympics (Mak, 2008, p. 22); 3) Jeju's close proximity to Japan, which allowed for easy air travel; and 4) a large presence of Zainichi Jejuans, Koreans of Jeju Islander origin in Japan, mostly

concentrated in the Osaka-Kansai region (Go, 2013, p. 113). Zainichi Jejuans, who (as of 2007) comprise one sixth of the nearly six hundred thousand Zainichi due to waves of migration in the wake of the Jeju Massacre and South Korea's postwar turmoil, formed a crucial bridge between Japan and Jeju. The *Construction Plan* is not specific about how to woo Zainichi, but the document is explicit in its intent to court their investment (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 1). Zainichi Jejuans are still remembered for having contributed some 3,470,254 trees for *gamgyul* (tangerine), Jeju's primary cash crop, between 1965 and 1979 (Go, 2013, p. 114), but they were also instrumental in spearheading the tourism economy. Two of the earliest major tourist hotels, the Jeju Tourist Hotel and Honeymoon House — now the Honey Crown Tourist Hotel and Paradise Hotel, respectively (Go, 2013, p. 143) — owe their existence to Zainichi Jejuans. The Ministry of Construction thus identified Zainichi as a key potential partners and investors.

Japanese tourism was a game changer for Jeju as much as it was for Hawai'i. Just as Japanese investment poured into Hawai'i — albeit miniscule compared to US American investment — and Japanese tourists became some of the most visible international visitors there starting in the late 1960s (Mak, 2008, p. 23), sixty percent of tourist arrivals to Jeju in the early 1970s were Japanese nationals. The number of Japanese residents would amount to up to eighty percent if including Zainichi Jejuans (Norma, 2014, p. 417). Korean Air Lines, which operated the Jeju-Busan-Osaka route from 1968 and thus enabled Jeju Airport to acquire its “international” credentials (Yi Gi'uk, 2003, p. 206), also had significant Japanese investment and stake in Jeju tourism development. In 1973, the Overseas Technical Cooperation Organization, an advisory entity under the Japanese Ministry of Transport, advised the possibility of establishing Jeju as a “tax- and visa-free zone” (Norma, 2014, p. 418), which predates the Free International City project by more than two decades.

The underside to the 1960s-1970s ‘Hawai'i’ exoticization for a rapidly growing Japanese clientele, however, was the so-called *gisaeng* tourism phenomenon. As the South Korean state sought to move beyond mainland Korean domestic tourism to international arrivals, marketing was increasingly directed toward the ‘salaryman’ (male middle-class office workers) market in Japan. Japan's public-private alliance was all too eager to exploit Jeju tourism, as corporate-provided tourism bonus packages for short trips to Korea — especially for *gisaeng* tourism, Caroline Norma (2014) observes — allowed for an easy pressure valve for restless office workers increasingly squeezed in Japan's vicious workplace culture. *Gisaeng*, or professional female entertainers, were an easy draw since they had already been exoticized and sexualized in Japanese imaginations since the colonial era. These attitudes persisted and therefore provided predictable experiences for this early wave of mass tourism. Japanese ministerial advice in a 1971 joint meeting with South Korean counterparts even emphasized capitalizing on Jeju's *gisaeng* parties and nightlife (Norma, 2014, p. 418). Although tourism in Jeju had flourished like its counterpart in Hawai'i, its association with cheap short-term package tours and sex tourism would persist well into the early 2000s. While salarymen comprised most Japanese tourists to Jeju, women ironically comprised the largest cohort for Hawai'i (Mak, 2008, p. 40). The gender dynamics of these tourisms are worth exploring, but are outside the scope of this article.

The ‘world-class’ national novelty, 1985

How is it that it is only *Samda* that has come to be traditionally associated with Jeju's natural tourism resources? [...] even aside from the folk cultural resources that give off an exotic atmosphere there are natural tourism resources like beaches, fishing sites, and hunting grounds, in following development efforts it has the tourism resources that make it enough to be called the *Hawai'i of East Asia* and can become a place of relaxation to release the *fatigue of civilization*.

– Gim Hyeondeok, April 18, 1973 (1996, p. 99; emphasis added)

The heaven-blessed island

“Singularity and alterity” in which a locale is constituted in “radical opposition to the mainland” (Goss, 1993, p. 675) has defined Hawai'i tourism promotion since 1973 as much as it has for Jeju. In Hawai'i's case, the Hawai'i Visitors Bureau, a state-subsidized non-profit consulting organization, utilized persistent themes of “earthly paradise, marginality, liminality, femininity, and *aloha*” (Goss, 1993, p. 676). Such perceptions have characterized US American perceptions since the early twentieth century, but Hawai'i became accessible to a far broader population in the 1960s-1970s. Hawai'i's ‘Otherness’ is also not the least due to the novelty of its majority Asian American and Pacific Islander population, groups often stereotyped as feminine in US American discourse. To South Koreans, Jeju, despite an overwhelmingly ‘Korean’ population, can be seen as being almost foreign — hinted in YK's Korean-yet-not-Korean self-awareness in the introduction — while also being an indelible part of South Korea. If exotic femininity served as an alluring representation for Hawai'i for US Americans (Goss, 1993; Skwiot, 2010), Jeju always had similar associations, as women comprise one of the island region's so-called Three Abundances. Already, in the 1960s, the Three Abundances no longer had their previous negative connotation. By 1985, they were part of the justification for calling Jeju ‘*cheonhye*’ (heaven-blessed). And, like Hawai'i, desire to exploit this untapped exoticness was a driver for cosmopolitan urbanization.

Jeju tourism became a success in the 1980s. The rapid growth of South Korea's middle class came with popularized desires for conspicuous consumption. Jeju, accessible yet still exotic, was a choice destination for honeymoon tourism as much as leisure escapism. Though emphasis on *gukje sujun* (world-class) facilities in the 1985 *Comprehensive Development Plan* suggest that Jeju was not sufficiently internationalized, the much-anticipated 1988 Seoul Olympics spurred a new urgency. Projections given in 1985 estimated that tourism would overtake tangerines, the island's main cash crop, by the end of that decade. The *Comprehensive Development Plan's* authors argued that Jeju possessed “the potential to be the citizens' choice tourism destination when the problems of tourism cost and time are resolved” (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 37). A far larger proportion of the South Korean population was now engaged in leisure tourism than in the 1960s and 1970s. Jeju's ‘heaven-blessed’ natural beauty and allegedly untapped landscapes were still the prime selling point, but tourist consumption had become far more complex, necessitating investment in high-end services, golf courses, marine sports, botanical gardens, and cultural facilities.

The 1985 plan, like its 1964 distant predecessor, encompassed all sectors of Jeju's economy, but tourism was now a defining feature for Jeju's future rather than a supplement. Euphoria over the then-upcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics likely fed into the optimism. The previous Park regime had some idea that Jeju's geography could allow it to occupy a unique niche position in Northeast Asia, but planners under the Chun Doo Hwan (Jeon Duhwan)

regime (1980-1987) took things many steps further. Whereas the 1964 commission concluded that Jeju was in an awkward situation, a reason for putting the *jayuhang* idea on indefinite hiatus (Ministry of Construction, 1964a, p. 13), the 1985 plans describe Jeju as a possible hub for airline routes between China and Japan as well as the US and Canada. As if to foreshadow the tourism slogans of the 2000s, it seemed that the world could indeed come to Jeju. The *jayuhang* idea was still impractical for 1985, but South Korea's economic boom, in conjunction with China's opening to broader international trade, kept it afloat. Planners projected tourism arrivals to grow at an exponential rate from a reported 856,000 in 1982 to an estimated 3,070,000 by 2001 (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 65).

Both phases for development strategy in the 1985 plan — the short- to mid-term period between 1985 to 1991 and the long-term period between 1992 to 2001 — prioritized tourism as the basis for regional growth, improved standard of living, and rebalanced development across Jeju. Foreign investment, which previously was supplementary and mostly discussed in relation to Japan and Zainichi Koreans, was more essential and diversified in scope. The plans also indicated the tiger economies of Taiwan and Singapore as regional competitors (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 115). To position Jeju as a contender for the rapidly growing Northeast Asian tourism market, the planning commission prioritized upgrades to facilities to *gukje sujun* levels (Jeju Province, 1985, pp. 18-19). The overtly political objectives of nation-state building via modernization and national pride of 1964 were still consistent in 1985. Tourism's political utility expanded, however, from uplifting national sentiment toward fostering receptiveness to globalization. The plans sought to use tourism to acclimate Jeju islanders to foreigners to “cultivate a progressive nature” (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 14). Though development practices still operated within a top-down framework that was not too different from the Park era, having Jeju serve as a mere novelty was not enough. If Governor Gim Yeonggwon boasted in 1962 that Jeju, given enough attention, could somehow outdo Hawai'i and Bermuda, it seemed that in 1985 that was precisely the objective.

World-class city

'*Gukje sujun*' has been as inextricable from tourism as urbanization. Jeju's tourism development depended on marketing its allegedly pristine physical and cultural geography for tourist consumption, but this very consumption has been the impetus for unceasing urbanization to cater to both a growing tourist influx and population. The *gukje sujun* push also meant a push for building more amenities to cater to both a more urbane tourist clientele and a need to acclimate the population to such standards. The 1985 plans, as in the far broader 1982 *Second National Comprehensive Development Plans*, stressed a need to rationalize habitation space for efficiency and more focus on services. The idea was to mitigate overconcentration for Jeju City, as had been the case for other expanding cities such as Greater Seoul, but this ironically seemed to have made the entire island an extension of the city. A key difference from Seoul was that Jeju City's satellites were not simply to relieve population pressure in Jeju City and rationalize urban expansion to avoid sprawl, but also featured tourism developments. Upgrading Jeju's spaces to conform to the standards of advanced capitalist nations was not only for locals but also to demonstrate South Korea's progress. Tourists were not simply confined to specified attractions and courses, after all.

As was the case for the Seoul Olympics, the 1985 planning commission assumed that the facilities built for tourists would ultimately benefit residents. Large-scale tourism

complexes, especially the Jungmun Tourism Complex, were included as part of the designated full *saenghwalgwon* (living zones) in the urban planning section (Jeju Province, 1985, pp. 233-234). Living zones, which are not administrative divisions but conceptualized “spheres of activity for a daily commute, shopping, and leisure” (Jung, 2013, p. 65), had formed the basic component of urban planning since the 1979 Promotion of Housing Construction Act. Though the 1985 plans echo the national-level 1982 *Second National Comprehensive Plans* in promoting a *bokji sahoe* (welfare society) to address a rampant problem of poor-quality urban living space (Ministry of Construction, 1982, pp. 1-3), this had a different implication for Jeju. The 1985 plan for Jeju afforded attention to traditional culture, environmental preservation, and regional uniqueness as economic functions and quality of life improvements in the *saenghwalgwon* to bolster local belonging and national pride (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 23). The rationale for expanding and enhancing educational facilities, too, was loosely linked to tourism as the state sought to better prepare islanders for interactions with foreign visitors (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 14). Like post-1959 Hawai‘i, the assumption was that tourism was not only a means for economic betterment, but necessary for broader social betterment.

With *bokji sahoe* as the 1980s catchphrase, Sinjeju (New Jeju City) as well as new suburbs were the solution to Gujeju’s (Old Jeju City) aging infrastructure and overcrowding. Prior to the 1970s, Jeju City was primarily a compact concentric town that grew around Sanjicheon Stream. Sinjeju, as well as Seogwipo’s Sinsigaji (New Town) project located a short distance to the west of the core city, followed the 1970s ‘new town’ trend in South Korea and thus took on aspects of the indigenized master-planned ‘garden city’ design scheme with dedicated green belt space and rationalized layouts (Oh H., 2006, pp. 881-882) to maintain urban living in a decongested living environment. Though Jungmun Tourism Complex was intended purely as a leisure space and had no residential or service functions for Jeju islanders, its planning style and its development paralleled that of Sinjeju as the city plans began to take shape from 1977 (Oh H., 2006, p. 883). By 1985, the first development phases for both were complete.

Trouble in paradise

Tourism development premised on selling an allegedly pristine space could only result in contradictory results. Since the *Second National Comprehensive Development Plan* of 1982, state planners were aware that pollution and environmental degradation were becoming an acute problem, and thus urbanization and tourism projects were still relatively confined to designated zones such as Jungmun. The purpose of the 1985 *Comprehensive Development Plans* was at once to marshal their economic potentials for a far-reaching development program and to rationalize them to avoid negative spillover effects. Spillover effects from tourism were indeed conspicuous, but the 1985 plans oscillated between caution over the island's limitations and ambition of exaggerated proportions. Exhortations to protect Jeju’s fragile natural and cultural environment juxtaposed boosterist claims that Jeju was still somehow a virgin geography of “cheap and broad hinterlands” (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 14).

The 1980s were the first halcyon days for Jeju as South Korea’s prime honeymoon destination, but they also came with troubling signs. What the plans highlighted as objectives also indicated problems that previous proposals and projects had failed to resolve. The *gukje sujun* emphasis and the need to train Jejuans to be more receptive to visitation hint that the island’s tourism had not realized the ‘Hawai‘i’ envisioned in the 1960s, even if development

had made major strides. A decade prior to the *Comprehensive Development Plan*, a 1975 commentary in the *Jeju Sinmun* newspaper lamented a continued lack of public regard (Sin, 1975/1996, pp. 126-127). Stress on environmental preservation and a need for a plan to reign in development amidst rapid tourism expansion also hint at an increasingly real threat of urbanization to Jeju's fragile ecology. A commentary four years later in 1989 by the Seogwipo YMCA director Gim Gwanhu (1996, pp. 240-241) complains of the history of violence committed against Jeju in the form of the thirty thousand killed in April Third and the three in five hundred people involved in *gisaeng* tourism. The 1985 *Comprehensive Development Plan* painted a rosy picture if all went according to plan, but all was certainly not well in paradise.

After 1985: The 'Kapechon' age

It [Yeon-dong] was pretty much same until 2011 or something [...] But now, holy! Wow! So many things happened and duty-free shops [...] I saw the signs, are changing into Japanese when I was a little kid. But, when I came back [...] in my sister's apartment in Sin [Sinjeju], Jewon Apartments [...] when I opened the window, I could hear Chinese, you know. That, like, never happened before. And then all the signs changed into Chinese.

– Jung Sinji (Jeong Sinji), interview June 24, 2015

From 2009, the South Korean state and the Jeju provincial government relaxed visa rules for foreign nationals — or more specifically, nationals of the People's Republic of China — for visiting Jeju and obtaining permanent residency via investment commitments of around US \$1.5 million (Tran, 2014, p. 92). This spurred the influx of Chinese tourism and proliferation of Chinese-oriented establishments that Jung Sinji described above. More than three quarters of all visitors were still of domestic origin, however. The Chinese tourism wave happened to stimulate new investments and coincided with a cultural shift in mainland South Korean domestic tourism where vacationing was no longer simply a leisure activity but also a search for the authentic.

Freelancer Jung Sinji, who hosts a local TV series showcasing the lives and knowledge of elderly Jeju Islanders, is around two decades older than YK and witnessed the peak and tail-end of the Japanese tourism bubble, and then the region's abrupt transition to Chinese tourism when she returned to Jeju after some stints away. She had worked on ethnographic research in Bali, but became disillusioned with academia — bluntly noting, “I don't trust anthropologists” — and left her graduate program some years ago. The sudden changes were at once expected and unexpected (if not unwanted) surprises. My conversation with Jung on June 24 was, like YK, focused on Sinjeju, which was completely new in Jung's childhood and in the processes of undergoing complete renewal by YK's time. In the wake of the Free International City and the 2009 visa changes, large sections of Sinjeju underwent a rapid transformation to cater purely to Chinese clientele, a phenomenon YK also noted in an instance where she recalled a shopkeeper seeming to have an awkward command of Korean. While Chinese tourism was most visually and aurally conspicuous in Jung's account, the resurgent domestic market led to a broad proliferation of new types of services to cater to a desire for authenticity such as mainlander South Korean-owned arts and crafts shops and artisan cafés. The Chinese tourism and gentrification wave Jung observes was indeed new.

Foreign visitation to Jeju was, up to the 2000s, often assumed to be from Japan. Many a Jeju islander also did not expect a ‘Jeju fever’ to take hold among domestic tourists as fiercely as what transpired.

Jeju could only be ‘like Hawai’i’. It consistently has been a novel short-term escape for metropolitan mainland Koreans, Japanese salarymen, and then nouveau riche Chinese. The pattern for development was set from 1963, articulated from 1985, and came into fruition with the Free International City by 2002. The end of the authoritarian rule in 1987 and administrative decentralization from 1995 were not necessarily ruptures from past precedent. What Jennifer Devine and Diana Ojeda (2017, p. 606) describe as ‘spatial fetishism’, the practice of constituting an idealized space while masking multiple contested histories, for the case of Hawai’i is an apt term for Jeju since 1963, due to the region’s small size (even compared to the Hawaiian Islands), turbulent history, and increasingly more intensive development ambitions. It was already apparent in 1985 that greater ease of travel enabled far more opportunities to experience more distant places beyond Jeju (like Jung herself did), but Jeju’s ‘Hawai’i’ appeal to mainland South Koreans continues to persist as it did in 1963–1985 regardless of changes in tourism habits.

Consistent since the 1960s in policy and perceptions on Jeju is the emphasis on the island region’s lack of development as an untapped plentiful frontier for authentic discovery for both the individual consumer and the nation. ‘Hawai’i’ still does not yet appear in formal planning documentation, but it remains omnipresent in perceptions of Jeju and in Jejuan anxieties. Even into the 2010s, despite (or perhaps because of) more readily available information, Jeju continued to maintain its appeal among mainland South Koreans as an internal frontier, much to the ambivalence, if not ire, of self-identified ‘*tobagi*’ (natives) (Tran, 2020). Just as Hawai’i tourism promotion transitioned away from predictable packaged tourism to an emphasis on individual experiences, Jeju in the post-1985 years moved toward individual fulfillment and authenticity via eco- and heritage tourism. Tourism trends in both Hawai’i and Jeju may have changed, but the effects have remained; both regions still experienced a crisis of overdevelopment and a growing sense of unease — if not resentment, as expressed by both YK and Jung Sinji — among islanders.

Mass tourism may have fallen out of favor, but novelty shops, artisan cafés, arts services, and healing spas proliferated, many capitalizing on Jeju’s alleged naturalness in contrast to hyper-urbanized metropolitan South Korea. In the 2000s, mainland South Korean tourists were increasingly drawn to supposedly hidden gems along the Olle Trail, a series of tourist walking routes whose name is derived from a Jeju word referring to narrow community paths, and once-isolated coastal villages such as Woljeong and Daepyeong. Individual tourists’ search for an authentic Jeju “transforms extant socio-natural relations into objects of tourist consumption” (Devine & Ojeda, 2017, p. 610). The irony in such a search is that the desire for an authentic non-packaged Jeju has led to what Media Jeju editor Gim Hyeonghun’s (2016, p. 298) counter-tourism guide *Jeju is Not that Kind of Place* derided as *kapechon* (café village). Where there was a scenic site that was not on the mass tourism itineraries in the 1963–1985 era, mainland South Korean émigré-run novelty shops or artisan cafés have appeared.

In terms of sheer volume, Jeju perhaps far outstripped Hawai’i when annual tourist arrivals hit 15,852,980 by 2016 (Tran, 2017, p. 411). The researchers involved in the 1985 plans probably did not anticipate the Free International City, much less the 2010s over-tourism crises, but their own words suggest that they were aware that Jeju would face severely

disruptive urban sprawl. The *raison d'être* for a complete planned tourism overhaul in the *Comprehensive Development Plan* was stated as follows: “Regardless of whether there is a development plan or residents’ intent for development, due to Jeju’s potential and increased tourism demand [...] will continue” (Jeju Province, 1985, p. 38). The planners hoped that they could reign in the forces unleashed with tourism while still maximizing potentials. Yet, these plans’ astronomical projections could only be self-undermining. They proposed development at far more ambitious scales despite an awareness of ecological limitations. While Chinese tourism has cratered and gone the way of Japanese tourism as of this article’s writing, Jeju remains a favored escape for South Korean mainlanders, especially in the age of COVID-19. Development continues, as do ambitions for making Jeju a genuine international hub. Even as planners in 1985 raised warning signs as they again do in the present, Jeju’s attraction still is a pervasive perception that it is somehow still South Korea’s last unspoiled hinterland.

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